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DISCHARGEABILITY: A NEW PERSPECTIVE
On November 3, 1970, the President signed into law Public Law
91-467,1 enacted to amend the Bankruptcy Act.2  The new provisions
supply striking changes in the discharge proceedings under the Bank-
ruptcy Act. To appreciate the significance of the new legislation and
to understand its purpose, some knowledge of the problem that inspired
the new amendments is necessary.
I. THE DISCHARGE PRIOR TO THE 1970 AMENDMENTS
Much of the focus of the new amendments is on the operation of
bankruptcy practice in relation to the ordinary wage earner. To the
ordinary wage earner, one of the most significant areas of bankruptcy
practice is the discharge. The importance of the discharge corresponds
to the evolution of the direction of our bankruptcy laws from a sole
concern for the creditors to a major concern for the debtor.3 How-
ever, it was as to the ordinary wage earner that the abuses of the bank-
ruptcy discharge most frequently occurred.1 4
The problems that followed the liberalization and availability of
bankruptcy and discharge were many. A philosophy that was based upon
a process in which an honest debtor, overburdened with debt, could
make his assets available for distribution equitably among his creditors,
and thereafter be released from all debts for a new start in life was subject
to many frailties. The problems can be initially traced to an early rule
laid down by federal courts that made the right to a discharge separate
and distinct from the effect of a discharge.5 While the bankruptcy court
determined whether bankrupt was entitled to a general discharge, the ef-
fect of the discharge as to any particular debt was a matter for any court
in which the creditor sought to enforce his claim.' Such a dichotomy was
apparently conceived to reduce the load of litigation in the federal courts
and to expedite the administration of bankrupt estates.7
The procedure was for the bankruptcy court to make a determination,
pursuant to § 14, as to whether the bankrupt was deserving of the priv-
ilege of a discharge. When an order of discharge became final, it bound
184 Stat 990 (1970).
2 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255 (1964) [Individual sections of the Bankruptcy Act old & new will
hereinafter be cited as § x without further citation or footnoting).
3 For detailed discussion of the historical evolution of bankruptcy law see Joslin, The Phi-
losophy of Bankruptcy-A Re-examination, 17 U. FLA. L REV. 189 (1964).
4 H. REP. No. 91-1502, 12 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4855 (1970).
G Smedley, Bankruptcy Courts as Forums for Determining the Dischargeability of Debts, 39
M tNN. L. REV. 651 (1955).
410n re Mirkus, 289 Fed. 732 (2d Cir. 1923); Teubert v. Kessler, 296 Fed. 472 (3d Cir.
1924).
7 See Smedley, supra note 5, at 652.
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all other courts on the issue of whether the debtor was entitled to be re-
leased from legal liability for the debts covered by the general terms of the
discharge.8 The order, however, being general in its terms, did not deter-
mine whether any specific debt was within its operation. The practical
result of this was that the bankrupt was not secure against being sued in
the state courts on his pre-bankruptcy debts.
Although the Bankruptcy Act declared that a discharge "shall re-
lease" the bankrupt from all his excepted debts, the established rule
was that a release was effective only if asserted as a defense to an action
by a creditor to enforce a debt, and that the defense was waived unless
affirmatively pleaded by the bankrupt.10 The creditor's failure to op-
pose the discharge did not prevent him from claiming the benefits
of § 17, if his claim came within the exceptions set forth therein as to
debts not affected by a discharge. Furthermore, if a creditor did oppose a
discharge on the grounds specified in § 14c, the determination that the
bankrupt nevertheless was entitled to a discharge was not res judicata
as to the dischargeability of the creditor's claim. 1 Accordingly, the
overwhelming majority of courts held that as a general rule, it was neither
proper nor sound policy for the bankruptcy court upon determining
the right to discharge to also determine whether certain debts so claimed
were nondischargeable within § 17. Thus, the court in In re Grover,12
concluded that "[n]ormally the court in which the debt is proceeded
upon is the proper forum to determine whether a discharge releases a
particular debt." This was because "[t~he right to a discharge is one
thing, and the effect of it, when granted, is another, and wholly distinct,
proposition."' 3
The objections and abuses of such a procedure were many. The cred-
itor often found it objectionable since the bankruptcy court's inca-
pacity to determine the effect of a discharge on a particular debt precluded
him from having even an obviously nondischargeable claim exempted
from the terms of the general discharge. His only remedy was a time
consuming often costly suit in a court of general jurisdiction to enforce
his debt and then overcome the debtor's defense of discharge by prov-
ing that his debt came within the § 17a exceptions of debts not affected
by discharge. The result was to relieve the bankruptcy court of con-
siderable work but at the same time to put the parties upon the mercies
8 1 COLLIER, BANKRupTcy 5 17.27 (14th ed. 1940).
9Id.
30 Helms v. Holmes, 129 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1942); In re Weisberg, 253 Fed. 833 (E.D.
Mich. 1918).
1t In re Scandiffie, 63 F. Supp. 264 (E. D. N. Y. 1945).
12 o -re Grover, 63 F. Supp. 644, 647 (D. Minn. 1945).
13 In re Rhutassel, 96 Fed. 597, 598 (N. D. Iowa 1899).
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of state courts for determination of whether the discharge decree pre-
vented enforcement of a bankrupt's debts.
Outrageous abuses were most prevalent with unscrupluous credi-
tors. The result of the divided jurisdiction was that debtors were fre-
quently harassed and coerced by creditors into paying debts that may
have been discharged. The common method employed was for the
creditor to wait until the bankruptcy proceeding had been closed and
the discharge granted and then sue in state court alleging that the debt
was not discharged under § 17 of the Bankruptcy Act. These creditors
usually relied on the allegation that the discharge did not release thq
debtor from liability because he had obtained money or property by
false pretenses or obtained property on credit upon a materially false
statement in writing respecting his financial condition with intent to de-
ceive. It was not difficult to construe that a debtor had made a false
statement in a loan or credit application since often such applications
were hastily and carelessly completed. 14  As though this was not abusive
enough of the spirit of the Bankruptcy Act, some creditors even resorted
to outright fraud in relation to loan applications. 15 Even though the
creditor's suit often was groundless the institution of the suit itself often
provided the necessary leverage either to force a settlement or to cause
the debtor to sign a new-and most significantly-undischargeable promis-
sory note. These abuses of the discharge procedure effectively nulli-
fied any gain from the discharge.
Tactics such as these had been all too common for many years. As
long ago as 1931, Mr. Justice Douglas'8 noted that victimization by small
loan companies of those least able to fight and protect themselves was
a common occurrence. Almost three decades later, in the Senate Report
on the 1960 Amendment to § 17a,' 7 it was noted in the legislative his-
tory that its purpose was mainly to curb the abuse by small loan com-
panies.
Thus, when suit on the discharged debt was filed in state court, the
14 Supra note 4, at 4856.
15 A news release from the May 12, 1967, edition of the Nashville Banner revealed such a
fraud:
The standard loan application form used by many loan companies in Nashville says
a person seeking a loan must list all his debts on the form before he can get a loan.
But... some loan company officials have instructed the borrower to sign the loan
application without listing all his debts as required.
Later, the borrower goes into bankruptcy ... and his lawful debts are discharged.
Thereafter, the loan company sues the borrower to collect the loan in the state court,
claiming that the borrower obtained the loan by fraud because he did not list all his
debts on the loan application form.
In other instances, instead of suing him, some loan companies have brought other
kinds of pressure... Taking advantage of the ignorance of debtors, they have threat-
ened the debtor with loss of his job and other penalties unless he pays the debt of
which he has been discharged in bankruptcy.
10 Douglas, Some Functional Aspects of Bankruptcy, 41 YALE L J. 329, 349 (1932).
17 S. REP. No. 1688, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2954 (1960).
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bankrupt had to answer, pleading his discharge as a defense; otherwise,
judgment went to the creditor by default. However, all too frequently
the bankrupt did not realize the consequences of ignoring the state
court proceeding. In many cases the bankrupt's failure to assert the
defense of the discharge was neither deliberate nor based upon an in-
tention to be bound by the obligation, but was due to inadvertance or
misunderstanding on his part. Many debtors mistakenly supposed that the
discharge operated automatically to release them from liability. Neverthe-
less, having failed to respond to the creditor's suit, the debtor had a default
judgment entered against him without the matter of dischargeability ever
being passed on by any court."8 The courts generally showed no inclina-
tion to disapprove of a practice which produced such unsatisfactory results
in so many instances? 9 Furthermore, only an occasional protest was ever
raised.2
In his article, A Plea for 'One Stop Service' in Bankruptcy,21 Referee
Coleman abhorred a rule that the referee must grant or deny a dis-
charge in toto; nondischargeability of particular debts being decided by
state courts alone. He stated:
In my mind this is a bad rule. It makes the referee a mere machine...
mechanically turning out discharges according to a prescribed form, as if
all bankrupts were alike. The referee lives with the case. . . Why
should he not be given authority to except debts from the discharge?
Why should this question not be settled at the time the discharge is
granted? There would be an end to litigation.... Why is the State Court
better qualified or equipped to pass on this question?22
Under this system which permitted or, perhaps, forced creditors to seek
determination of their daims in state courts, the bankruptcy court issued
"a strange form of decree which must be taken to another court for an
interpretation of its effect." 2
II. LocAL LoAN Co. v. HUNT
In 1934, the question of the bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction to pass on
the dischargeability of a debt and to enjoin a creditor from enforcing
a dischargeable debt was presented to the Court in Local Loan Co. v.
Hunt.' In adopting the 1970 amendments, Congress so as to more
18 See cases cited supra note 10. See also Beneficial Loan Co. v. Noble, 129 F.2d 425 (10th
Cir. 1942).
19 In re Innis, 140 F.2d 479 (7th Cit. 1944); Beneficial Loan Co. v. Noble, 129 F.2d 425
(10th Cir. 1942).2 0Helms v. Holmes, 129 F.2d 263,269 (4th Cit. 1942).
2125 REF. J. 31 (1951).
22 Id.
28 Twinem, Discharge-What Court Determines the Effect Thereof, 21 REF. J. 33, 34
(1946).
24292 U. S. 234 (1934).
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fully effectuate the policy and philosophy of a bankruptcy discharge,
broadened that which the U. S. Supreme Court only initiated at the thresh-
old in Local Loan.
In that landmark case Local Loan challenged the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy Court to enjoin it from prosecuting a suit in the Municipal
Court of Chicago against the bankrupt's employer to enforce a wage
assignment which the bankrupt, Hunt, had executed as security for a
loan. The debt had been included in Hunt's schedule of liabilities in
a bankruptcy proceeding, and the federal court had previously entered an
order discharging him from all provable debts and claims. However,
Local Loan Co. contended its right to collect the indebtedness out of
the debtor's future earnings was unaffected by the bankruptcy proceed-
ing because the Illinois Supreme Court had ruled that an assignment
of future wages created a lien which was not invalidated by the discharge
in bankruptcy. Furthermore, the federal court was bound by the deci-
sion in view of the well recognized rule that the effect of the discharge
was a matter to be determined by the court in which the discharge was
to be pleaded as a defense.
The Supreme Court in sweeping terms established the jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court to issue the injunction. The Court declared that:
[A] federal court of equity has jurisdiction of a bill ancillary to an
original case or proceeding in the same court... to secure or preserve the
fruits and advantages of a judgement or decree rendered therein .... 25
The Court said that such an action was not within the jurisdiction of a
state court. Moreover, it was held that decisions by other federal courts
refusing to hear similar suits on the ground that the effect of a discharge
was a matter to be determined by any court in which the discharge may be
pleaded were not in harmony with the rule the Court had announced.
The existence of the bankruptcy court's authority to determine the ef-
fect of the adjudication and enjoin the loan company's threatened in-
terference having been broadly confirmed, the Court immediately ad-
vised restraint in the use of this authority:
It does not follow, however, that the Court was bound to exercise its au-
thority. And it probably would not and should not have done so except
under unusual circumstances such as here exist.2 6
The 'existence of the bankruptcy courts' power to intervene to prevent en-
forcement of a discharged debt in a state court thus was finally established.
However, after such an admirable beginning, the Court spoke no further
on the matter.
Unfortunately, the limiting factors in Local Loan gained immediate




OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
tion that the referee had the power to determine the dischargeability
of specific claims. Although Local Loan made it appear that a claim
of no jurisdiction in the bankruptcy court would fail, it nearly be-
came settled law that the parties could not insist that the matter be
heard by the bankruptcy court as a matter of right. Although usually
refusing to interfere with a creditor's enforcement efforts, the bank-
ruptcy courts generally have recognized their power to take such action,
but have stressed the Supreme Court's reference which cautioned against
the exercise of this power except under "unusual circumstances." This
attitude was probably further engendered by the desire to protect the
jurisdiction of state courts and by a fear of overburdening the bank-
ruptcy courts with the addition of this function to their already heavy
load. Thus, the bankruptcy courts would usually not interfere on behalf
of the debtor.2
In implementing this restrictive attitude, decisions specifically rejected
the arguments of the bankrupt that certain commonly recurring situa-
tions presented sufficiently "unusual circumstances" to justify action by
the bankruptcy court.29 It was reasoned that if the debt was actually
discharged, the bankrupt could have a state court declare the enforce-
ment proceedings invalid. No relief was given against the creditor's
enforcement of a judgment obtained as a result of a state court's hav-
ing erroneously applied the state law in ruling the debt nondischargeable. °
The debtor's remedy was said to be an appeal to a higher state court
to reverse the erroneous trial court's judgment. Nor was the threat of
the bankrupt being imprisoned under a body execution for failing to
satisfy the creditor's judgment regarded as a serious enough invasion
of the debtor's rights to sustain interference by the bankruptcy court.31
The most coldly technical attitude displayed by the courts, however,
was found in the cases refusing to grant relief against enforcement of a
creditor's judgment even though the bankrupt pleaded that he was unable
financially to carry an appeal to higher state courts to correct the trial
27 Walters v. Wilson, 142 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1944).
28 Helms v. Holmes, 129 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1942) (unless the state remedy was inadequate);
Ciavarella v. Salituri, 153 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1946), and In re Risser, 177 F.2d 567 (4th Cir.
1949) (unless the failure of the bankruptcy court to act would cause special embarrassment or
irreparable injury to the bankrupt); In re Marshall, 24 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) (unless
there are special conditions calling for intervention); Beneficial Loan Co. v. Noble, 129 F.2d
425 (10th Cir. 1942) (unless action by the bankruptcy court was necessary to effectuate its order
or discharge); State Finance Co. v. Morrow, 216 F.2d 676 (10th Cit. 1954) (unless action by
the bankruptcy court was necessary to prevent the impairment or defeat of its jurisdiction).
20 Ciavarella v. Salituri, 153 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1946); In re Stoller, 25 F. Supp. 226 (S. D.
N.Y. 1938); In re Harris, 28 F. Supp. 487, (E.D. I1. 1939).
30 Cstarai v. General Finance Corp., 173 F.2d 798 (6th Cir. 1949); In re Ulen, 46 F. Supp.
437 (S. D. N. Y. 1941).
31 In re Devereaux, 76 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1935); Csatari v. General Finance Corp., 173
F.2d 798 (6th Cir. 1949).
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court's error in finding the debt nondischargeable1 2 Ignoring the fact that
the court was dealing with a person who had recently surrendered his as-
sets for distribution to his creditors, the same court which presided over
that proceeding took the position that if a remedy was legally available to
the bankrupt in the regular judicial processes of the state, then, even
though he could not afford to invoke that remedy, he did not need the spe-
cial protection of the bankruptcy court.
The rationale throughout all the decisions denying relief was that
the bankrupt's remedy in the state courts was adequate if it was theoreti-
cally available--even if not practically available--and that Local Loan
did not apply unless the state courts in which the bankrupt was sued
would erroneously deny the dischargeability of the obligation. It was
emphasized that the bankrupt either had or could have appeared in the
state court proceeding to assert his discharge in defense, and could have
appealed the adverse decision to a higher state court-which pre-
sumably would have corrected the lower court's decision if it was in
error-or the bankrupt could have gone to the United States Supreme
Court by certiorari. By this reasoning a number of decisions declared that
the principles of res judicata precluded the bankrupt from relitigating
the issue of dischargeability in the bankruptcy court after an adverse
decision in a state court.33 Other courts ruled that in failing to assert
his discharge as a defense in the state court action, the bankrupt was guilty
of gross negligence as to disqualify himself from the equitable relief
which the bankruptcy court could grant in proper circumstances. 4  As
an equity court, it could intervene to prevent enforcement of a judg-
ment of another court only if the bankrupt's failure to assert his rights
was due to fraud, accident, or mistake not resulting from his own neglect.
Thus, the Local Loan doctrine answered one particular problem, but
the results of the doctrine were not the most effective procedure for
achieving the discharge purpose of the Bankruptcy Act. The differing
interpretations of "unusual circumstances" failed to give guidance on a
national level as to the action a bankruptcy court would take upon a
petition to determine the effect of a discharge. There was no effective
test as to what facts should exist before a bankruptcy court would de-
termine the effect of the discharge by exercising its ancillary jurisdiction.
Thus, the basic factor which led to the criticisms of the traditional
procedure and the Local Loan doctrine as applied-that is, to the abuses
32 Beneficial Loan Co. v. Noble, 129 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1942); In re Innis, 140 F.2d 479
(7th Cir. 1944).
331n re Devereaux, 76 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1935); Beneficial Loan Co. v. Noble, 129 F.2d
425 (10th Cir. 1942); Walters v. Wilson, 142 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1944); In re Risser, 177 F.2d
567 (4th Cit. 1949).
34 Helms v. Holmes, 129 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1942); In re Innis, 140 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1944).
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of the bankrupt usually by small loan companies-precipitated the enact-
ment of the 1970 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act.
III. THE 1970 AMENDMENTS TO THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
The major purpose of the amendments is to effectuate more fully
the discharge in bankruptcy by rendering it less subject to abuse by harass-
ing creditors. This purpose required amendment of the Act since the
means for the abuses were found in the Act itself.
Section 2a(12) and § 38(4), respectively, were amended to give
to courts of bankruptcy and referees in bankruptcy additional jurisdic-
tion to "determine the dischargeability of debts, and render judgments
thereon." Section 14b was also amended to require the court to fix
a time both for filing of objections to discharge and for filing applica-
tions to have dischargeability of debts determined."5
The matter of dischargeability of the types of debts most commonly
giving rise to the abuse of harassing creditors are now within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. New § 17c(2) provides, with one
partial exception,3 that a creditor invoking the grounds of:
1. 17a(2) (false pretenses, false representations, false financial state-
ments and wilful and malicious conversion);
2. 17a(4) (fraud or defalcation by an officer or a fiduciary); or
3. 17a(8) (other wilful and malicious injuries to person or prop-
erty)
must apply to the bankruptcy court within the time fixed to determine the
dischargeability of his debt and, "unless the application is timely filed
the debt shall be discharged."
"Discharge" appears to be used in the sense that the debts will be
deemed discharged for purposes of later attempts to invoke any of the
above grounds to except a debt from discharge by creditors who failed
to make application."7 This new subsection is specifically enforceable by
other new provisions. New § 17c(4) authorizes the bankruptcy court
to enjoin a creditor from instituting or continuing actions in other
courts "prior to or during the pendency of a proceeding to determine
. . . dischargeability under § 17c." Further, the new discharge, pursuant
to new § 14f, makes any judgment obtained in any other court null
and void as a determination of the personal liability of the bankrupt
35 The times fixed for each purpose need not be the same, but neither may be less than 30
days after the date set for the first creditor's meeting. Normally, neither may be more than 90
days after that date, but the court is given discretion to extend the time for either.
36 If the creditor contends that his debt is excepted by § 17a(8) (wilful and malicious in-
juries to person or property) and the "right to trial by jury exists and any party to a pending
action on such debt has timely demanded a trial by jury or if either the bankrupt or a creditor
submits a signed statement of an intention to do so," the creditor is not required to submit the
dischargeability issue to the bankruptcy court.
3 7 Countryman, The New Dischargeability Law, 45 AM. BANKR. L. J. 1, 26 (1971).
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with respect to debts discharged under new § 17c(2) and enjoins all
creditors from instituting or continuing any action to collect such debts
as personal liabilities of the bankrupt.
Thus, the new amendments attempt to correct earlier abuses of dis-
charge proceedings by removing from the jurisdiction of nonbankruptcy
courts all of the grounds for exception from the discharge which proved
susceptible to earlier abuses. Now if the creditor wishes to invoke
any of the grounds for exception from the discharge, he must do so in
the bankruptcy court within the time fixed by the amendments. If he
does not do so, the exceptions are no longer available to him. If he
attempts to invoke them elsewhere prior to discharge, he may be en-
joined. After the discharge he is permanently enjoined from invoking
them to establish liability or to attempt to collect a prebankruptcy judg-
ment.
The new amendments also cure the creditor objection that the incapac-
ity of a bankruptcy court to determine the effect of a discharge on a
particular debt precluded the creditor from having even an obviously
nondischargeable claim exempt from the terms of the general discharge.
New § 17c(1) provides that "[tihe bankrupt or any creditor may
file an application with the court for the determination of the dis-
chargeability of any debt." This provision is optional and dischargeabil-
ity would be determined by the bankruptcy court only if the option is
exercised, otherwise the issue of dischargeability would be left for
determination by a nonbankruptcy court. Nonbankruptcy courts only
have such jurisdiction if neither the creditor nor the debtor submits the
issue to the bankruptcy court. Once one of them does however, new
§§ 17c(4) and 14f again operate to effectively enforce the jurisdic-
tion of the bankruptcy court. It appears that there is no time limit
fixed for invoking the concurrent jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.
The time fixed for filing such applications applies only to those applica-
tions which a creditor is required to file under new § 17c(2)."' In fact,
the implication of new § 17c(6) concerning reopening of a bankruptcy
case is closed. 9
Whether the application to determine dischargeability is under the
optional new § 17c(1) or the mandatory new § 17c(2), the subsequent
proceedings are governed by new § 17c(3). The bankruptcy court is to
determine the dischargeability issue after hearing upon notice. If the bank-
ruptcy court determines a debt is dischargeable, it makes "such orders as
388"As to all other debts ... the bankruptcy court is given concurrent jurisdiction with the
State courts under § 17c(1). Either the bankrupt or the creditor may apply to the bankruptcy
court for a determination of dischargeability and these applications are not subject to the time
limits of section 14b." NBC Memo of January 21, 1970, 116 Cong. Rec. H9550 (Daily ed. Oct.
5, 1970).
30 Supra note 37, at 30-31.
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are necessary to protect or effectuate" such determination. On the other
hand, if it determines that a claim is not dischargeable, it "determine[sl
the remaining issues, render[sJ judgment, and makejs] all orders~sl nec-
essary for the enforcement" of its determination.4" This is intended to
make clear that the bankruptcy court's determination may be enforced as
federal court judgments usually are enforced, including writ of execution
and proceedings in aid thereof.""'
New § 14g, an adaptation of 28 U.S.C. § 1963 for the registration of
judgments of federal district courts, provides that a final order may be
registered in any other federal district and when so registered shall have
the same effect as an order of the bankruptcy court of the district where
registered. This supplements and effectuates the enjoining feature of the
discharge order for a debtor who moves to another district.
The new amendments also clarify the law concerning the discharge of
debts in a subsequent proceeding after the denial of discharge for certain
reasons in an earlier proceeding. Where a discharge was denied in an
earlier proceeding under § 14c(5) because the bankrupt had obtained a
discharge in a still earlier proceeding initiated within the prior six years,
some courts entertaining a third proceeding concluded the denial of dis-
charge in the second proceeding should not be taken as an adjudication
that the debtor would not later be entitled to a discharge of debts sched-
uled in the second proceeding.' Other courts disagreed.43 New § 17b(1)
provides that denial of a discharge solely under § 14c(5) in the second
proceeding does not bar the release of debts in a subsequent proceeding.
A denial of a discharge solely under § 14c(8) also does not bar release
of debts in a subsequent proceeding since such a denial does not represent
an adjudication on the merits that the debtor was not entitled to a dis-
charge.44 New § 17b(2) provides that dismissal of a prior proceeding
"without prejudice for failure to pay filing fees or secure costs" will not
bar a release of debts in a subsequent proceeding. A final saving provi-
sion relates to a debt which is excepted from discharge because it was not
scheduled in time for proof and allowance and the creditor did not re-
ceive timely notice or knowledge of the bankruptcy proceeding. Such a
debt may be released by discharge in a subsequent proceeding.
40 In order to avoid any implication that the new law was intended to pressure a creditor
into filing an application for determination of dischargeability which could then be treated as a
consent to summary proceedings on counterclaims asserted by the trustee, it was provided in §
17c(3) that a creditor who files an application for determination of dischargeability "does not
submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court for any purposes other than those specified in ...
subdivision c."
4 1 Supra note 37, at 31.
42 Turner v. Boston, 393 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1968); In re Masterson, 240 F. Supp. 543 (N. D.
Cal. 1963).
43 Chopnick v. Tokatyan, 128 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 667 (1942).
44 Hearings before Subcomm. of House Comm. on the Judiciary on S. J. Res. 88, H. R. 6665
and H. R. 12250,91st Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1969).
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The amendments also afford greater protection to creditors by expand-
ing causes for which a discharge, once granted, can be revoked. Previously,
the bankruptcy court had little control over a bankrupt once his discharge
had been granted. Section 15, as amended, authorizes revocation of dis-
charge for refusal to obey an order of, or to answer a material question
approved by the court and to allow an application to revoke to be filed
at any time during pendency of the proceeding or within one year after
discharge is granted, whichever period is longer. Additionally, § 15 now
authorizes revocation of a discharge on the ground that the bankrupt "be-
fore or after discharge, received or became entitled to receive property of
any kind which is or which becomes a part of the bankrupt estate" if he
"knowingly and fraudulently fails to report or to deliver such property
to the trustee."
Generally, the new amendments provide for an all inclusive updating
of the procedural aspects of the discharge to protect more fully the inter-
ests of both honest bankrupts and creditors without changing the policy
in determining when and as to what debts a discharge may be obtained.45
However the amendments were not enacted without objection. In com-
menting upon a similar bill introduced in the 86th Congress, Referee
Sherman Warner wrote:
[I]f this or a similar proposal should become law, the court would be
burdened with an avalanche of attempts by creditors . . . to have their
daims excepted....
The enactment of the bill would create many administrative problems.
Would sufficient referees and referee personnel be designated to han-
dle the extra work? 46
The criticisms of Referee Warner are searching and honest, but the fact
is that the majority of judges and referees who have expressed their views
regard these objections as superficial and irrelevant. When it becomes
generally understood that the bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction to deter-
mine the effect of a discharge as well as the right to it, the litigation should
dwindle away; attempts by certain creditors to defeat the clear intent of the
Bankruptcy Act will be ceased. Even assuming there is a marked increase
in litigation creating new administrative and legal problems, this should
not obstruct change where change is needed. Furthermore, the bankruptcy
courts should readily accept the extra burdens in order to protect the integ-
rity of the courts and to assure that the rights of the honest but unfor-
tunate bankrupt are protected.
Several objections are raised to the extension of the bankruptcy court's
jurisdiction. It is argued that there is a distinction between the discharge
45 Supra note 4, at 4855.
4 6 Warner, Discharge in Bankruptcy; May Objections be Withdrawn?, 31 REF. J. 25, 29
(1957).
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itself and its effect as barring a particular debt. This difference is re-
flected in the Act, it is argued, since the statutes treating obtaining a dis-
charge, § 14, and the debts which are dischargeable or nondischargeable,
§ 17, are separate. Also it is argued that prior law gave both creditor and
debtor adequate protection in state courts. As already mentioned the
adequate protection was merely illusory. It was of little comfort or as-
surance to the discharged bankrupt who usually was without adequate
funds to institute and maintain the requisite litigation. Thus, any attempt
to discredit the new amendments because of adequate protection existing
under the state law does not reflect cogent analysis. Further objections
have been raised to suggest that compelling either the bankrupt or the
creditor to submit certain questions of fact to a summary procedure would
contstitute unjust deprivation of the right to trial by jury. This objection
has been highly controversial. Requests for jury trials in straight bank-
ruptcy proceedings are not commonplace--as distinguished from Chapter
X, XI, XII proceedings. They are especially rare in cases involving
consumer or individual bankrupts. Although a bankruptcy proceeding is
largely an equity proceeding, jury trials are granted when requested and
the case is referred back to a district court judge.4 7
All in all, these arguments and objections seem to emphasize technical-
ities at the expense of actualities-precedent at the expense of progress.
The amendments eliminate the present uncertainty caused by the unde-
fined "unusual circumstances" qualification of Local Loan, and vest the
bankruptcy court with the full and final authority to determine discharge-
ability or nondischargeability of debts in all cases-not merely those cases
in which the court recognized the existence of the hazily defined "unusual
circumstances." This necessarily lends more certainty and predictability
to the law. Furthermore, there is the benefit of a highly qualified court.
Both the creditor and the bankrupt will have issues decided by a court
well-versed in the problems of bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court, being
directly involved with the operation of the bankruptcy system, is in a better
position than the state courts to view the matter in proper perspective. To
leave the determination of the effect of a bankruptcy discharge in the
hands of innumerable state courts of varying types and qualities is to
destroy all hope of ever achieving any semblance of uniformity of deci-
sion.48 Also if the bankruptcy court should determine that an obligation
is dischargeable, the creditor cannot confront the debtor with future actions
in state court. Therefore, the creditor has lost a weapon formerly used to
abuse and harass the bankrupt.
47Supra note 4, at 4857.




As the overriding consideration in support of the new amendments, it
is submitted that they provide for greater furtherance of the purposes of
the Bankruptcy Act. The aims of the Act are twofold:
1. [T]o insure prompt and efficient realization and pro rata dis-
tribution, without preference, of the assets of insolvent debtors...49
2. [T]o relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive
indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and
responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes. 0
The referee's immediate determination best insures "prompt and efficient
realization and pro rata distribution" of the bankrupt's assets. It avoids
the time consuming procedure of the state courts. It eliminates duplica-
tion of effort and expense by two court systems. And it allows the tribu-
nal already familiar with the facts and the law of the case to make the
ultimate decision.
The referee's determination as to dischargeability best permits the bank-
rupt to start afresh, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of
pre-existing debt. It enables the bankrupt to know immediately the effect
of the discharge. Knowing his own position, the bankrupt will no longer
be a target for harassing creditors threatening state court action. He will
be able to begin a new opportunity in life with a dear field for future
endeavor with only a minimum of mental anxiety over past indebtedness.
George W. Birch
40 McKenzie, Suspended or Conditional Discharges, 19 REF. J. 45 (1945).
50 William v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 236 U. S. 549, 554-55 (1915).
